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1 Introduction
We aim to provide empirical evidence on the apparent conundrum regarding public bank’s
contribution to the performance of small and medium enterprises (SME). Speciﬁcally, we
test one of the main reasons put forward by savings banks in respect to their beneﬁcial
impact on the business landscape in a developed economy: do German savings banks
facilitate the funding and beneﬁcial development of SME?
The role of banks to provide corporate ﬁrms with access to ﬁnancial funds remains
crucial in most developed economies (Hackethal, Schmidt, and Tyrell 1999). Speciﬁcally
SME, which frequently form the backbone of the economy, rely on banks to fuel their
growth (Berger, Klapper, and Udell 2001; Samitas and Kenourgios 2004). According to
Audretsch and Elston (2002), both the role of SMEs and banks is particularly important
for the third largest economy of the world: Germany.
At the same time, the German banking system exhibits some distinct characteristics
compared to other industrialized countries. Speciﬁcally, the share of total assets managed
by publicly owned savings banks is relatively large (Koetter et al. 2006). The relative
merits and concerns regarding public banks, however, continue to fuel a heated, and
sometimes even ideological, debate among both practitioners and academics. But the
scientiﬁc evidence provides mixed guidance to this debate. On the one hand, a number of
studies report that public banks are less proﬁtable and more risky than privately owned
banks (Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi 2007). On the other hand, other empirical stud-
ies that distinguish, for example, developed and developing countries ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
relation between public ownership and proﬁtability (Micco, Panizza, and Yanez 2007).
In response to the ongoing policy debate as well as the mixed economic evidence, public
banks in general, and German savings banks in particular, highlight their contribution to
the economy as follows: to establish and maintain steady relations especially with SME,
which might otherwise be shut-oﬀ external sources of ﬁnance.
Theoretical evidence if intense bank-ﬁrm relationships are beneﬁcial to the latter re-
mains unclear a priori. Boot and Thakor (2000) illustrate the ambivalence of relationship
banking. The lock-in eﬀect can be to the ﬁrm’s detriment: proprietary knowledge of bor-
rower characteristics by the bank paired with less alternatives to evade re-negotiability
of soft budget constraints of ﬁrms with few banking relations can jeopardize both banks’
and ﬁrms’ incentives. In turn, long-term relations can enhance the eﬃciency of credit
2contracts and may provide access to external funds during crises, too.
The empirical evidence on the relation between ﬁrm performance and bank-ﬁrm re-
lations mirrors the theoretical ambiguity. For example, Berger et al. (2007) report for
Indian state-owned banks that these do not serve opaque small borrowers signiﬁcantly
more often compared to other customer groups. In turn, they ﬁnd evidence that corpo-
rates maintaining relations with state-owned banks have few bank relations and rely on
these to a larger extent. In turn, D’Auria, Foglia, and Reedtz (2007) report for Italian
banks that hausbank-relations enable ﬁrms to borrow at lower cost. Likewise, Cole (1998)
ﬁnds for the U.S. that SME with existing relationships to banks are more likely to receive
further credit, thus underpinning the value of private information generated by an arm’s
length potential lender. The ambiguity of the international empirical evidence is reﬂected
by ﬁndings of Agarwal and Elston (2001) on German ﬁrm performance. While they re-
port that German ﬁrms enjoy easier access to capital, their results do neither show higher
proﬁtability nor growth for these ﬁrms.
In light of the mixed empirical evidence, we attempt to provide insights based on
conﬁdential data obtained from the German Savings Bank Association. We seek to assess
more directly the hypotheses that savings banks support especially more constrained SME
and the question to what extent close borrower-lender relationships are beneﬁcial to the
development of these ﬁrms. The involvement of savings banks in this regard can consist of
several layers; the channeling of government aids, continued operative business mentoring,
provision of liquidity insurance in situations of unexpected borrower rating deterioration
and long-term credit contracts. As suggested by Elsas (2005) we use the dependency on
savings bank debt as proxy for hausbank-relationship and predict ﬁrms’ excess growth
based either only on internal or short-term funding.
Our ﬁndings indicate that a higher proportion of savings bank loans enhances ﬁrms to
grow beyond rates which would be possible by internal or short-term ﬁnancing only. These
results hold up to diﬀerent model speciﬁcations and hausbank-relationship proxies. Since
our sample consists entirely of savings banks clients the results apply only to hausbank-
relationships of ﬁrms with savings banks.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and summary
statistics. Section 3 provides an overview over the measures of the constraint growth
rates and examines the implications that arise for the SME in our sample. In section 4
3we present the methodology and discuss the variables used in the regressions. Our results
are reported in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
2 Data and summary statistics
The ﬁrm-level data covers ﬁnancial statements of SME from all federal states in Germany.
Most of the ﬁrms in our sample are rather small (with average total assets of e1,091,409)
thus reﬂecting a representative picture of the German SME landscape. The unbalanced
sample consists of 467,033 ﬁrm observations averaged over the period from 1996 – 2006
and has been provided by the German Savings Bank Association (DSGV). All ﬁrms in the
sample are savings banks clients with diﬀering degrees of savings bank loans. However,
the data does not contain information about the number or type of the other lenders. For
the gross domestic product (GDP) of the respective regions the data is complemented by
the Federal and State statistical oﬃces data (DeStatis). To control for the competitive
behavior of savings banks in Germany we calculate Lerner indices from the ﬁnancial
statements of savings banks.
Figure 1: Proportion of micro, small and medium–sized ﬁrms by years
Figure 1 shows the proportion of micro, small and medium-sized ﬁrms in the sample. According to the deﬁnition of the
European Commission a micro (small/ medium–sized) ﬁrm is constituted by a headcount with a maximum of 10 (50/ 250)
full–time equivalents (FTE), a turnover below e2m (10/ 50) or a balance sheet total less than e2m (10/ 43).
In Table 1 we present the median and mean values of a number of relevant features
4Table 1: Descriptives by degree of dependency on savings bank credit
Table 1 reports the medium and mean values (in parentheses). The ﬁgures are reported in quartiles by the degree of ﬁnancial
dependency on savings banks, i.e. the proportion of savings bank loans to total bank liabilities. The leverage is calculated
by total debt divided by total assets, long term credit are all debt maturities over 5 years over total assets, average cost of
interest by interest expenses over total debt, interest coverage by earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over interest
and lease expenses and trade credit by accounts payable over total debt. The table comprises 467,033 ﬁrm observations.
Median (mean) values Savings banks loans to total bank loans
1996–2006 < 25% 25%<50% 50%<75% > 75% Average
Leverage 81.3% 81.3% 83.2% 83.7% 82.4%
(76.6%) (76.4%) (77.6%) (76.3%) (76.7%)
Long term credit 11.3% 10.0% 13.9% 21.8% 14.3%
(20.4%) (18.2%) (20.8%) (28.2%) (21.9%)
Average cost of interest 4.7% 4.8% 4.9% 5.0% 4.8%
(4.8%) (4.8%) (5.0%) (5.0%) (4.9%)
Interest Coverage 1.6x 1.7x 1.8x 2.1x 1.8x
(3.3x) (3.7x) (3.9x) (5.5x) (4.1x)
Trade credit 10.6% 11.9% 11.8% 9.9% 11.1%
(15.2%) (16.6%) (16.5%) (15.6%) (16.0%)
Total assets 1,810,996 1,170,000 835,000 549,639 1,091,409
(8,105,090) (4,137,974) (2,773,842) (1,594,725) (4,152,908)
of the SME in our sample. The values are averaged over the observation period and
are reported by the degree of the credit-relationship with savings banks. First of all, we
see that the SME in our sample are quite highly leveraged with a ratio of debt to total
assets of 82% and average interest cost of 4.8%. Although ﬁrms with a high share of
savings banks loans pay marginally higher interest rates they seem to have less problems
accommodating their ﬁnancial obligations (including leases) as depicted by the higher
interest coverage ratios. The use of trade credit with a median of 11% is rather low
in comparison to SME in other economies such as Spain where short-term non-bank
ﬁnancing makes up about 65% of total ﬁrm debt (González, Lopez, and Saurina 2007).
The higher share of savings bank debt ﬁnancing for small ﬁrms suggests that these ﬁrms
are more likely to have hausbank-relationships with their respective savings bank (Elsas
2005). This suggestive evidence is further corroborated by the higher long-term credit
ratios of companies with a share of savings banks ﬁnancing above 75% which unperpin
the long-term implicit contracts between a hausbank and its debtors. Table 2 provides a
description of the nexus of capital intensity, return on assets before tax (RoA) and savings
banks ﬁnancing and puts these ﬁgures into perspective.
5Table 2: RoA (median) over states, savings banks dependency and capital intensity
Table 2 depicts the return on assets before tax (RoA) over the period 1996 – 2007 by federal states split into the capital-intensity (CI) of the respective ﬁrms and their share of savings bank
loans of all bank loans. The CI, in turn, is calculated as the ratio of property, plant and equipment (PPE) to total assets by quartiles (e.g. CI 1 depicts ﬁrms with a ratio of PPE to total
assets up to 25%). On the right hand side the observations per state as well as the average RoA per state are reported.
1996 – 2006 25%< savings banks loans 25%<50% savings banks loans 50%<75% savings banks loans 75%<100% savings banks loans
State CI 1 CI 2 CI 3 CI 4 CI 1 CI 2 CI 3 CI 4 CI 1 CI 2 CI 3 CI 4 CI 1 CI 2 CI 3 CI 4 Obs RoA
Schleswig-Holstein 3.8% 3.2% 1.9% 0.7% 2.9% 4.1% 4.4% 1.8% 3.0% 4.8% 4.4% 2.4% 5.5% 5.6% 4.8% 3.4% 15,256 3.6%
Lower Saxony 2.8% 3.8% 3.6% 1.2% 3.5% 4.3% 4.0% 2.1% 3.4% 4.4% 4.8% 2.3% 5.2% 5.5% 4.5% 2.8% 49,125 3.6%
North Rhine-
Westphalia
3.1% 4.3% 3.6% 1.6% 4.0% 4.7% 3.7% 2.0% 4.2% 5.6% 4.7% 3.0% 5.9% 6.6% 6.1% 3.8% 63,087 4.2%
Hesse 2.7% 3.5% 3.1% 1.5% 3.1% 3.8% 3.2% 1.4% 3.5% 4.8% 3.9% 2.6% 4.9% 4.9% 4.8% 4.0% 42,423 3.5%
Rhineland-Palatinate 2.6% 3.8% 2.4% 0.4% 3.1% 3.5% 2.8% 1.6% 3.5% 4.1% 4.7% 2.1% 5.5% 5.9% 5.4% 3.3% 32,363 3.4%
Saarland 2.1% 3.2% 2.1% 1.9% 3.1% 4.8% 2.4% 1.5% 2.9% 4.4% 2.4% 2.6% 4.2% 4.3% 4.0% 3.2% 11,457 3.1%
Baden-Württemberg 3.5% 4.1% 3.9% 2.4% 3.7% 5.1% 4.7% 2.6% 4.1% 5.7% 5.2% 3.5% 6.5% 7.0% 6.0% 4.7% 109,157 4.5%
Bavaria 2.8% 3.5% 3.3% 1.7% 3.2% 4.4% 4.6% 2.0% 3.6% 4.5% 4.8% 2.7% 5.6% 6.2% 6.1% 4.1% 109,084 3.9%
Obs West 21,932 15,908 10,980 5,808 22,671 15,044 8,543 4,517 26,973 17,187 10,133 5,026 135,600 73,974 54,905 37,023 431,952 -
Average West 2.9% 3.7% 3.0% 1.4% 3.3% 4.3% 3.7% 1.9% 3.5% 4.8% 4.4% 2.6% 5.4% 5.8% 5.2% 3.7% - 3.7%
Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania
1.4% 3.8% 2.1% 1.4% 3.6% 4.2% 6.5% 0.7% 2.1% 3.8% 4.6% 0.0% 3.8% 4.0% 4.2% 2.3% 1,703 3.0%
Brandenburg 2.8% 2.1% 1.9% -0.2% 2.6% 3.4% 2.8% 0.2% 2.2% 3.0% 3.3% 1.1% 3.2% 3.8% 2.5% 1.7% 11,225 2.3%
Saxony-Anhalt 1.9% 2.1% 1.9% 0.5% 3.2% 2.7% 3.2% 0.5% 2.5% 3.4% 2.4% 1.1% 2.7% 3.1% 2.7% 1.4% 12,861 2.2%
Thuringia 2.6% 1.9% 2.7% 0.2% 3.2% 4.2% 3.3% 0.8% 3.1% 3.5% 3.0% 3.1% 3.3% 3.2% 3.2% 1.9% 7,677 2.7%
Saxony 1.8% 3.3% 2.1% 0.3% 3.2% 3.4% 3.1% 1.3% 4.3% 3.4% 4.8% 2.1% 4.5% 4.1% 3.6% 2.6% 15,792 3.0%
Obs East 1,574 1,984 1,740 1,212 1,663 1,914 1,260 686 2,084 2,397 1,721 725 8,688 8,824 7,739 5,047 49,258 -
Average East 2.1% 2.6% 2.1% 0.4% 3.2% 3.6% 3.8% 0.7% 2.8% 3.4% 3.6% 1.5% 3.5% 3.7% 3.3% 2.0% - 2.6%
Obs All 23,506 17,892 12,720 7,020 24,334 16,958 9,803 5,203 29,057 19,584 11,854 5,751 144,288 82,798 62,644 42,070 481,210 -
Average All 2.5% 3.2% 2.6% 0.9% 3.2% 4.0% 3.8% 1.3% 3.2% 4.1% 4.0% 2.1% 4.4% 4.7% 4.2% 2.8% - 3.2%
6An inspection yields several interesting ﬁndings: First, we see that ﬁrms with a capital
intensity in the second quartile (a proportion of ﬁxed assets to total assets of 25%<50%)
are in almost every state and every proportion of savings banks loans the most proﬁtable
companies in the sample. To ﬁnd an explanation for this ﬁnding it would be interesting
to consider the industries that lie within this capital intensity range to draw conclusions.
However, due to the anonymized nature of the sample this information was not available.
Secondly, the average proﬁtability within each capital intensity quartile rises with the
proportion of savings banks loans. Since we know, that these ﬁrms have a closer borrower-
lender-relationship with at least one bank, a possible explanation could be that better
access to external ﬁnancing enables them to seize proﬁtable investment opportunities
which, in turn, leads to higher RoA’s. Lastly, we observe that ﬁrms in the western regions
of Germany have a higher average proﬁtability of 0.9% which could be driven by a slower
growth of the economy in the eastern states (Ludwig 2006).1
3 Measures of ﬁrm growth capacity
Our aim is to examine the impact of close borrower-lender relationships with savings
banks on ﬁnancial constraints and ultimately ﬁrm growth. However, ﬁrms are not equally
aﬀected by the presence of ﬁnancial constraints. First, companies with suﬃcient cash ﬂows
from operations to fund proﬁtable investments are less aﬀected than ﬁrms whose internal
resources do not suﬃce to accommodate their ﬁnancial requirements. Second, in the vein
of Rajan and Zingales (1998) ﬁrms from some industries have higher equilibrium leverage
ratios. Ideally, we would therefore diﬀerentiate, say, capital intensive manufacturing ﬁrms
from service oriented business. Due to missing data on industry codes, we therefore
estimate a predicted growth rate for each ﬁrm, relying either only on its internal funds or
on short-term ﬁnancing. Then, to assess whether better access to external funding enables
ﬁrms to seize growth opportunities, we ﬁrst need to identify ﬁrms that require external
ﬁnancing and investigate whether their realized growth is contingent on the provision of
1To test whether the median of the RoA’s in the respective groups are in fact diﬀerent of each other we
conduct a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. The H0-Hypothesis is that the median
of the RoA in the fourth quartile (75%<100% savings banks loans) is the same as the one in the remaining
groups (0%<75% savings banks loans). The test results give strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis
(signiﬁcant at the 1% level) suggesting that the higher median RoA’s for ﬁrms with a proportion of
savings bank loans above 75% are not caused by random ﬂuctuation.
7(long-term) ﬁnancing by savings banks.2
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) point out that both the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow and
its optimal investment level are endogeneous. They illustrate this proposition by the
example of a capital intensive ﬁrm which is in need of larger investment expenditures to
fund further growth. If the ﬁrm’s products face high demand or the market power of
that company is suﬃciently high, it may be able to ﬁnance its growth only from internal
resources. Another ﬁrm, on the other hand, with the same properties but facing less
favorable prospects may need external ﬁnancing in order to attain the same growth rate.
To account for this endogeneity, we use two types of predicted ﬁrm growth. First, a
measure that predicts the maximum growth rate if a ﬁrm only relies on its internal funds
and second a measure for ﬁrms that can also resort to short-term ﬁnancing. Subsequently,
we test the hypothesis that ﬁrms which experience suﬃcient demand can exceed their pre-
dicted growth rates by obtaining (long-term) savings banks ﬁnancing. In the development
of the model we follow suggestions of cross-country ﬁrm-level studies by Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1998, 2002). First, we derive a growth measure based on Higgins (1977)
which describes the maximum growth if a ﬁrm retains all earnings and ﬁnances investment
only from internal sources of ﬁnance (constraints on short- and long-term ﬁnancing). This
internal growth rate IGR equals:
IGRit = RoAit=(1   RoAit); (1)
where RoA denotes return on assets. In turn, if ﬁrms use also short-term funding to fund
growth, the second ﬁrm growth benchmark equals the ﬁrms return on long-term assets
LTA, where the latter equals total assets less short-term debt:
SGRit = RoLTAit=(1   RoLTAit): (2)
Based on equations (1) and (2), we then follow Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002)
and create for each ﬁrm i in region r at time t an indicator variable, whether realized
growth exceeded predicted growth.
2As a further robustness check we also followed Rajan and Zingales (1998) who calculated benchmark
growth rates based on industry codes. We attempted to substitute these by benchmark growth rates based
on quartiles of capital intensity and regional diﬀerences. However, the results came out inconclusive which
suggests that this measure is too crude to predict the appropriate growth rate for industries within a
given capital intensity.
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a potential problem to our model. We attempt to mitigate this problem by averaging
the afore generated indicator variables over all observations for each ﬁrm in order to
smooth out production. Thus for each ﬁrm we obtain one measure for the excess growth
with internal and one for short-term funding. This variable is in turn used as dependent
variable in a regression model, which is explained by the proportion of savings banks
credit of the respective ﬁrm and further control variables.
Further, our model makes several assumptions which may underestimate the maximum
attainable growth rate and overestimate its cost; it assumes that the ﬁrms’ use of their
unconstrained sources of ﬁnance in relation to total assets does not change over the
observation period and that the production technology desists from advancements that
might reduce the cost of replacement investments.
Table 3 presents for each ﬁrm size category and by federal states the proportion of ﬁrms
which exceed their internal and short-term growth rates. We derive these ﬁgures by ﬁrst
calculating a dummy variable for each ﬁrm and year, that equals one if the annual growth
rate of sales exceeds the maximum attainable internal (IGRit) or short-term borrowing
(SGRit) growth rate respectively. Thus, we obtain the dummy variable (STGROit) if
a ﬁrm exceeds its internal growth rate and (LTGROit) if a ﬁrm exceeds its short-term
ﬁnanced growth rate in a given year. Subsequently, the dummy variables are averaged
over the observation period to obtain a metrical scaled variable for each ﬁrm ranging from
0 to 1.
By using the same ﬁrm size classiﬁcation as the European Commission, Table 3 ex-
amines whether ﬁrms of diﬀerent size also exhibit diﬀerent growth properties. We see
that approximately 40% of all ﬁrms in our sample exceed their internal growth rates.
Larger ﬁrms tend to exceed their growth rates (IGR and SGR) more often than smaller
ﬁrms, potentially due to easier access to ﬁnance to facilitate growth. Moreover, a higher
proportion of ﬁrms in the eastern regions of Germany exceed their growth rates in com-
parison to the western states (48.5% vs. 42.7% for IGR and 44.8% vs. 36.3% for SGR).
This may be due to lower levels from which eastern ﬁrms start to grow accordingly faster.
As Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) noted, access to long-term ﬁnancing seems to
be particularly important for (large) German ﬁrms. Our sample of smaller ﬁrms exhibits
similiar properties; if we take, for instance, the 33.2% of micro SME in the western regions
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Table 3 presents the proportion of ﬁrms by states whose mean annual growth rate of sales exceeds the means of their
constrained growth rates (IGR and SGR). For each ﬁrm the internal growth rate (IGRt is given by (RoAt/(1   RoAt))
where RoAt is the ﬁrm’s return on assets before tax. Maximum short-term ﬁnanced growth rate (SGRt) is deﬁned as
RoLTAt=(1   RoLTAt) where RoLTAt is the ratio of earnings before tax to long-term capital. The ﬁrms are divided into
three diﬀerent size ranges in accordance with the deﬁnition of the European Commission. A micro (small/ medium–sized)
SME is constituted by a headcount with a maximum of 10 (50/ 250) full–time equivalents (FTE), a turnover below e2m
(10/ 50) or a balance sheet total less than e2m (10/ 43).
Proportion of ﬁrms that exceed their:
Internal growth rate Short-term ﬁnanced growth rate
1996 – 2006 IGR=RoA/(1-RoA) SGR=RoLTA/(1-RoLTA)
State Micro Small Medium Micro Small Medium
Schleswig-Holstein 31.9% 46.7% 43.7% 28.7% 40.9% 36.8%
Lower Saxony 33.7% 45.6% 49.5% 30.0% 38.9% 40.6%
North Rhine-Westphalia 32.4% 44.4% 46.0% 27.8% 36.4% 36.0%
Hesse 32.9% 45.2% 46.3% 29.2% 38.7% 38.4%
Rhineland-Palatinate 32.9% 47.7% 51.1% 28.9% 40.8% 43.3%
Saarland 38.0% 48.2% 55.6% 34.6% 41.3% 45.4%
Baden-Württemberg 32.1% 47.1% 49.0% 27.4% 39.8% 39.1%
Bavaria 31.9% 45.9% 47.8% 28.3% 39.0% 39.2%
Obs West 369,042 79,443 16,795 369,042 79,443 16,795
Average West 33.2% 46.3% 48.6% 29.4% 39.5% 39.9%
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 33.7% 58.9% 64.5% 30.6% 56.1% 64.5%
Brandenburg 36.6% 49.3% 52.6% 34.0% 45.2% 49.3%
Saxony-Anhalt 36.6% 51.1% 56.2% 34.4% 46.6% 51.7%
Thuringia 35.8% 51.1% 58.3% 32.5% 47.0% 51.0%
Saxony 35.3% 50.9% 55.7% 32.0% 45.9% 50.6%
Obs East 43,360 9,204 1,625 43,360 9,204 1,625
Average East 35.6% 52.3% 57.5% 32.7% 48.2% 53.4%
Obs All 412,402 88,647 18,420 412,402 88,647 18,420
Average All 34.4% 49.3% 53.0% 31.0% 43.8% 46.6%
in Table 3 which required some form of external ﬁnancing over the sample period, then
only 3.8% (33.2% - 29.4%) could ﬁnance their growth entirely by using only short-term
debt. Thus, access to external long-term ﬁnancing seems to be vital for ﬁrms to fund
their growth.
In addition to ﬁrm size eﬀects on growth, it is ultimately the impact of hausbank-
relationships we are interested in. In Table 4 we examine the constraint growth rates
SGR and IGR by the proportion of savings bank loans to total loans and by federal
states. We see that the pattern of rising predicted growth rates of eastern and western
German states by the proportion of savings banks loans is similar to the observed values
for the RoA’s in Table 2. Moreover, the majority of ﬁrms (52.7%) in our sample seem
to have close ties with their savings bank as depicted by the high number of companies
in the 10th decile. Strikingly, the growth rates SGR as well as IGR increase almost
monotonically for each state; the mean values of SGR and IGR roughly double from the
1st to the 10th decile. This ﬁnding leads to the question whether the higher predicted
10Table 4: Internal and short-term ﬁnanced growth rates
Table 4 presents the short-term (SGR) and internal (IGR) ﬁnanced growth rates of ﬁrms by deciles of savings bank loans
to total bank loans. The ﬁrst row in each federal state presents the SGR and the second row the IGR. The further we go
right the higher the proportion of savings banks loans to total bank loans. Column "10", for instance, shows the SGR and
IGR of ﬁrms with over 90% savings banks loans for each state respectively.
1996–2006 Proportion of savings bank loans to total bank loans in deciles
State (SGR/ IGR) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N. of
Obs.
Mean
Schleswig-Holstein 5.0% 5.8% 6.4% 7.7% 6.8% 7.7% 6.7% 8.0% 8.1% 8.7% 15,089 7.1%
2.6% 2.7% 3.5% 4.1% 3.4% 4.1% 3.6% 4.4% 4.7% 5.5% 3.9%
Lower Saxony 6.3% 7.3% 6.6% 8.9% 8.5% 8.0% 8.0% 9.0% 8.4% 8.9% 48,616 8.0%
3.2% 3.5% 3.1% 4.1% 3.9% 4.0% 4.0% 4.6% 4.3% 5.3% 4.0%
North Rhine-
Westphalia
6.7% 7.3% 7.8% 8.7% 9.0% 9.1% 10.8% 10.7% 11.2% 11.7% 62,652 9.3%
3.2% 3.7% 3.9% 4.2% 4.3% 4.5% 5.2% 5.1% 5.6% 6.6% 4.6%
Hesse 6.4% 6.2% 7.2% 6.6% 6.8% 6.8% 8.5% 8.8% 8.9% 8.7% 42,068 7.5%
2.9% 3.1% 3.3% 3.3% 3.4% 3.5% 4.1% 4.6% 4.7% 5.2% 3.8%
Rhineland-Palatinate 5.5% 6.6% 6.5% 6.5% 7.1% 6.9% 9.2% 8.7% 9.6% 9.9% 32,046 7.7%
2.7% 3.2% 2.7% 3.1% 3.2% 3.3% 4.4% 4.5% 5.0% 5.9% 3.8%
Saarland 5.1% 5.2% 7.9% 7.1% 6.5% 5.6% 7.7% 8.2% 8.0% 8.3% 11,439 7.0%
2.2% 2.6% 3.4% 3.3% 3.0% 2.3% 3.3% 3.7% 4.0% 4.6% 3.2%
Baden-Württemberg 7.4% 8.2% 8.5% 9.5% 9.1% 9.5% 10.0% 10.8% 10.7% 12.5% 108,604 9.6%
3.7% 4.0% 4.3% 4.5% 4.4% 4.8% 5.0% 5.6% 5.7% 7.2% 4.9%
Bavaria 6.2% 6.9% 6.5% 7.4% 8.5% 8.2% 7.9% 8.6% 8.9% 10.9% 108,152 8.0%
3.1% 3.3% 3.2% 3.7% 4.2% 4.1% 4.2% 4.5% 4.9% 6.5% 4.2%
Obs West 21,426 19,246 18,490 18,451 19,047 20,033 22,555 26,029 35,112 228,277 428,666
Mean SGR 6.1% 6.7% 7.2% 7.8% 7.8% 7.7% 8.6% 9.1% 9.2% 10.0% 8.0%
Mean IGR 3.0% 3.3% 3.4% 3.8% 3.7% 3.8% 4.2% 4.6% 4.9% 5.8% 4.1%
Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania
3.6% 3.3% 4.4% 8.0% 9.8% 6.0% 8.2% 5.4% 9.1% 5.3% 1,678 6.3%
2.3% 2.0% 2.7% 4.8% 5.2% 2.9% 4.3% 3.3% 5.6% 3.4% 3.7%
Brandenburg 1.5% 2.5% 5.3% 6.9% 4.7% 6.1% 5.5% 4.8% 5.6% 5.0% 11,097 4.8%
1.0% 1.5% 2.6% 2.8% 2.3% 3.1% 3.0% 2.8% 3.1% 3.1% 2.5%
Saxony-Anhalt 3.1% 4.4% 4.0% 7.4% 5.5% 5.2% 4.9% 5.1% 4.7% 4.4% 12,584 4.9%
1.4% 1.9% 1.8% 3.3% 3.1% 2.6% 2.8% 2.8% 2.7% 2.8% 2.5%
Thuringia 3.2% 3.7% 5.9% 5.2% 5.7% 4.8% 6.2% 6.0% 7.4% 4.6% 7,610 5.3%
1.7% 2.1% 3.0% 2.8% 3.3% 2.7% 3.4% 3.4% 4.3% 3.0% 3.0%
Saxony 2.9% 5.8% 5.8% 6.5% 5.9% 6.4% 7.9% 7.7% 7.4% 5.8% 15,582 6.2%
1.5% 3.1% 2.7% 3.3% 3.1% 3.7% 4.4% 4.5% 4.3% 3.8% 3.4%
Obs East 2,907 2,399 2,102 2,142 2,311 2,435 2,861 3,355 4,672 23,367 48,551
Mean SGR 2.9% 3.9% 5.1% 6.8% 6.3% 5.7% 6.5% 5.8% 6.8% 5.0% 5.5%
Mean IGR 1.6% 2.1% 2.6% 3.4% 3.4% 3.0% 3.6% 3.4% 4.0% 3.2% 3.0%
Obs All 24,333 21,645 20,592 20,593 21,358 22,468 25,416 29,384 39,784 251,644 477,217
growth rates also lead to higher excess growth for (augmented) savings bank ﬁnanced
SME. Table 5 attempts to give a ﬁrst, descriptive insight. Likewise Table 3, we see that
SME in the eastern states more often exceed their internal and short-term ﬁnanced growth
rates. Further, the spread of ﬁrms’ internally and short-term ﬁnanced excess growth rates
yields some interesting ﬁndings: Throughout all deciles the spread between STGRO and
LTGRO is higher in the western states. This suggests that on average ﬁrms in the eastern
states have a greater exigency to fund their growth with long-term loans. Moreover, the
spreads are declining for all states from the 1st to the 10th decile indicating that ﬁrms
with a higher proportion of savings banks loans use long-term funding more often to
11ﬁnance their growth. Yet, the most apparent observation are the declining excess growth
rates from the 1st to the 10th decile.
Table 5: Excess growth rates by share of savings bank loans
Table 5 presents the median of the excess growth variables STGROi and LTGROi by deciles of savings bank loans and by
federal states. The ﬁrst row in each federal state presents the proportion of ﬁrms that grow at average rates exceeding the
IGR rate while the second row shows the analogous data for the proportion of ﬁrms above their SGR rate.
1996–2006 Proportion of savings bank loans to total bank loans in deciles
State (STGRO/ LT-
GRO)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N. of
Obs.
Mean
Schleswig-Holstein 47.0% 43.3% 39.6% 39.3% 39.2% 37.4% 34.3% 35.5% 35.4% 31.5% 15,089 38.3%
40.2% 36.7% 33.0% 33.9% 35.3% 33.0% 32.1% 31.2% 31.6% 28.8% 33.6%
Lower Saxony 44.8% 41.3% 42.3% 39.1% 39.0% 39.4% 38.4% 36.2% 35.9% 34.2% 48,616 39.1%
37.7% 34.9% 36.5% 33.4% 33.2% 34.7% 33.7% 31.5% 31.4% 30.7% 33.8%
North Rhine-
Westphalia
44.3% 41.1% 40.4% 39.6% 38.3% 37.5% 35.4% 35.5% 34.2% 32.5% 62,652 37.9%
37.3% 34.3% 33.8% 32.9% 31.8% 31.4% 29.2% 29.9% 28.4% 28.1% 31.7%
Hesse 42.2% 42.8% 42.5% 41.2% 41.3% 39.3% 37.1% 35.7% 33.5% 32.3% 42,068 38.8%
36.1% 37.2% 35.9% 35.2% 36.1% 33.8% 31.9% 30.7% 29.0% 29.2% 33.5%
Rhineland-Palatinate 46.5% 42.4% 41.8% 40.2% 39.4% 39.6% 36.9% 34.4% 34.5% 32.5% 32,046 38.8%
39.4% 37.3% 36.6% 35.4% 33.7% 34.2% 31.6% 29.8% 30.1% 28.9% 33.7%
Saarland 45.0% 47.1% 42.1% 43.9% 44.8% 45.7% 43.3% 42.9% 38.9% 36.3% 11,439 43.0%
39.4% 42.2% 37.4% 40.0% 39.7% 41.1% 38.7% 38.6% 35.3% 33.0% 38.5%
Baden-Württemberg 40.8% 40.1% 39.1% 38.1% 38.9% 38.4% 36.0% 35.1% 34.4% 32.6% 108,604 37.3%
34.0% 34.2% 33.1% 32.1% 32.1% 32.1% 30.3% 29.3% 29.1% 28.2% 31.4%
Bavaria 42.5% 40.1% 39.3% 38.7% 37.3% 37.5% 36.9% 35.4% 34.1% 31.9% 108,152 37.4%
36.9% 34.6% 34.3% 34.0% 32.4% 32.3% 32.0% 30.8% 30.1% 28.4% 32.6%
Obs West 21,426 19,246 18,490 18,451 19,047 20,033 22,555 26,029 35,112 228,277 428,666
Mean STGRO 37.6% 36.4% 35.1% 34.6% 34.3% 34.1% 32.4% 31.5% 30.6% 29.4% 33.6%
Mean LTGRO 44.1% 42.3% 40.9% 40.0% 39.8% 39.3% 37.3% 36.3% 35.1% 33.0% 38.8%
Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania
53.5% 48.9% 48.6% 43.7% 37.5% 44.8% 34.9% 42.3% 34.2% 34.2% 1,678 42.3%
52.1% 47.4% 42.6% 38.6% 32.7% 42.7% 33.6% 38.7% 32.0% 31.9% 39.2%
Brandenburg 49.9% 47.8% 43.6% 39.8% 40.7% 39.9% 39.0% 38.8% 38.3% 35.1% 11,097 41.3%
45.0% 43.4% 39.0% 35.7% 36.1% 37.6% 35.5% 36.8% 35.8% 33.5% 37.8%
Saxony-Anhalt 47.9% 49.5% 44.5% 44.4% 42.0% 40.5% 39.6% 38.4% 38.4% 36.8% 12,584 42.2%
43.8% 46.2% 39.1% 38.5% 37.9% 37.7% 36.6% 35.9% 36.1% 35.3% 38.7%
Thuringia 49.3% 47.2% 42.3% 46.6% 45.1% 41.0% 37.3% 41.1% 37.4% 36.7% 7,610 42.4%
45.8% 42.3% 37.9% 42.8% 39.8% 36.3% 32.8% 36.2% 33.0% 34.4% 38.1%
Saxony 49.8% 44.6% 46.4% 43.8% 41.6% 38.6% 37.2% 38.2% 33.8% 35.2% 15,582 40.9%
45.3% 40.3% 41.8% 38.9% 36.7% 35.0% 33.1% 34.3% 30.0% 32.7% 36.8%
Obs East 2,907 2,399 2,102 2,142 2,311 2,435 2,861 3,355 4,672 23,367 48,551
Mean STGRO 46.4% 43.9% 40.1% 38.9% 36.6% 37.9% 34.3% 36.4% 33.4% 33.6% 38.1%
Mean LTGRO 50.1% 47.6% 45.1% 43.7% 41.4% 41.0% 37.6% 39.7% 36.4% 35.6% 41.8%
Obs All 477,217
However, this apparently unambiguous relation may be misleading. Since Table 1
showed that savings banks primarily have hausbank-relationships (deﬁned by a proportion
of savings banks credits above 75%) with smaller ﬁrms and Table 3 further revealed that
larger ﬁrms have a greater tendency to grow above predicted rates, the relation in Table 5
could simply be driven by the size of ﬁrms. An answer to this puzzle can only be provided
by a regression analysis that accounts for multiple factors and will be adressed in section
5.
124 Methodology
In this section we predict the afore generated variables which indicate whether ﬁrms grow
above or below their internal and short-term ﬁnanced growth rates. To this end, consider
a standard logit model.
P(Yi = 1jXi) =
exp( + Xi + 
Zj)
1 + exp( + Xi + 
Zj)
(3)
where P is the probability that ﬁrm i will grow above benchmark growth. This likelihood is
conditioned on Xi a vector of explanatory variables (ﬁrm-speciﬁc covariates, state speciﬁc
variables), , , and 
 are parameters to be estimated. Given the large sample size,
we ﬁrst estimate below the logit model for each state separately and subsequently for
the whole sample. Note that within each state we observe mostly multiple savings bank
regions j. For these we therefore also include region-speciﬁc controls. As such our result
is analogous to the cross-country perspective in Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).
For reasons of simpliﬁcation, the right hand side of the equations presented within the
following tables generally depicts the exponential term in our logit regression.
Firm characteristics X We specify the following ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. Our primary
variable is the proportion of a ﬁrm’s savings bank loans to all bank loans (SB). Whited
(1992) found that ﬁnancial constraints and thus, a diminished ability to access exter-
nal ﬁnancing, has a direct inﬂuence on ﬁrms’ investment plans. Therefore our variable
describes the dependency of a ﬁrm on its savings bank and aims to test whether haus-
bank-relationships help ﬁrms to seize their growth options.
The rationales for the beneﬁts of close borrower-lender relationships are suggested in
the ﬁnancial intermediation literature: increased credit availability, intertemporal smooth-
ing, enhancement of borrower’s project payoﬀs and liquidity insurance as well as more
eﬃcient decisions in case of ﬁnancial distress (e.g. Sharpe (1990), Petersen and Rajan
(1995), Boot and Thakor (2000), Elsas (2005)). Since we consider two measures of con-
traint growth (STGRO and LTGRO) it would be conceivable that hausbank-relationships
have a mixed impact. A positive relation, for instance, with ﬁrm growth relying only on
internal funds but no signiﬁcant relation with ﬁrm growth if ﬁrms also have access to
short-term borrowing would indicate that savings banks on average only provide short-
term funding to their customers. Conversely, a signiﬁcant relation for the savings bank
13variable and LTGRO but not with STGRO would suggest that the provision of long-term
ﬁnancing is the crucial element of savings bank ﬁnancing.
We also include several control variables. The variable SIZE is deﬁned as the log
of ﬁrm’s total assets. Cross-country studies of ﬁnancing choices by Demirgüç-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1999, 2001) have found diﬀerent patterns of ﬁnancing for small and large
ﬁrms in the use of long-term ﬁnancing and trade credit. Further, larger ﬁrms may beneﬁt
from internal capital markets and face less ﬁnancing constraints due to better access to
capital markets, thus we would expect positive inﬂuence of size on ﬁrm growth. More-
over, since savings banks have a strong focus on smaller business entities (see Table 1)
controlling for size is likely to be crucial to the results.
The variable leverage (LE) controls for a ﬁrm’s debt structure and is measured as
total debt obligations over total assets. Myers (1976) and Jensen (1986) predict that
the leverage has an important inﬂuence on investment policy. In the model of Myers
(1976), debt can give rise to an "overhang" eﬀect, creating an incentive to reject projects
that have positive net present value if the beneﬁts from accepting the project accrue
to the bondholders without also increasing shareholders’ wealth. Jensen (1986), on the
other hand, suggests that debt can serve a valuable bonding role, by limiting the ability
of managers to invest in negative net present value projects. Furthermore, Barclay and
Morellec (2006) posit that increasing growth options lead to a rise of the under-investment
costs of debt and at the same time decreases the beneﬁts of debt in mitigating the free
cash ﬂow problem. Hence, their results imply a negative relation between book leverage
and growth options.
Capital intensity (CI) controls for diﬀerent growth patters of industrial structures that
are associated with either higher or lower investments in ﬁxed assets. Generally, the entry
barriers are higher for industries with high initial set-up costs and therefore competition
may be less than in non-capital intensive industries, such as service or wholesale. This
would imply a positive relation with ﬁrm’s excess growth. On the other hand, ﬁrms with
a high share of ﬁxed assets may be particularly susceptible to credit rationing due to their
higher ﬁnancing demand for long-term assets and thus grow below-average when cut oﬀ
from short- and/or long-term ﬁnancing.
Lending choices are also conditional on general and local business conditions. In turn,
14regional indicators of ﬁnancial development are of importance to economic growth as
shown by Lucchetti, Papi, and Zazzaro (2001) and Koetter and Wedow (2006). Hence,
we include in Z regional macroeconomic and banking market covariates, too. In particular,
we hypothesize that especially the competitive stance banks in the region aﬀects access
to ﬁnancial funds (see e.g. Boyd and Nicolã (2005)). We use Lerner indices provided by
Koetter and Vins (2008) to proxy banks’ power to charge prices over marginal cost and
thus the ability to enjoy some kind of market power. The indices are calculated as
L =
(AP + AC)   MC
AP + AC
; (4)
where AP and AC stand for average proﬁts and average cost respectively which sum in
average revenues. MC denotes marginal cost (see Appendix, Table 11).
Petersen and Rajan (1994) hypothesize that banks with exclusive access to customers
and some ability to conduct mark-up pricing reap rents. This would suggest that ﬁrms
are less likely to grow above average when average Lerner indices are high in their region.
However, as shown by Boot and Thakor (2000), when banks can engage both in relation-
ship and arm’s-length lending, the two types of lending can be substitutes. In particular,
increased bank competition could render relationship lending more attractive for banks
since it provides better insulation against price competition. One can further argue that a
monopolistic market structure generally substitutes for relationship lending because this
is an instrument to deliberately create bank monopoly power. The "market power" hy-
pothesis which asserts that competition promotes credit availability is inconsistent with
the "information" hypothesis put forth by Petersen and Rajan and thus the resolution is
ultimately an empirical issue.
The variable GDP depicts the growth of the respective regional gross domestic product.
It controls for possibility that the ﬁrms’ ambition to fund excess growth externally is
aﬀected by the rate of growth of the regional economy. In a fast growing economy the
rate of proﬁt is likely to be high. This, in turn, will tend to increase the predicted growth
rates IGR and SGR allowing for faster growth without the dependence on external ﬁnance.
155 Results
The regressions in Table 6 and 7 investigate whether ﬁrms which exceed their internally
and short-term ﬁnanced growth rate require external ﬁnancing. The dependent variables
are STGROi and LTGROi respectively. We start with the former and inspect ﬁrst the
variable ﬁrm size as proxy for a ﬁrms’ access to capital markets. As we can see the
variable is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level for all federal states. This suggests that
the properties that are associated with larger ﬁrm size enhance access to external capital
which, in turn, is used to fund growth.
Table 6: Constraints on short- and long-term external ﬁnancing
Table 6 reports the regression results of the logit model with STGROi as dependent variable. STGROi is calculated as the
proportion of years for each ﬁrm in which the sales growth exceeded the predicted growth rate if a ﬁrm funds its growth
internally. Since we observed in the data that ﬁrms have either excess growth or no excess growth in each year of the
observation period the mean values over the years are for about half of the ﬁrms in the sample either zero or one; therefore
we choose a logit approach to model the relationship. Furthermore, we control for regional diﬀerences in the federal states
by using dummy variables for diﬀerent regions within each state (not reported). The estimated model is STGROFirmi=














Schleswig-Holstein -9.800*** 0.155** 1.735*** 2.725** 2.224*** -0.00396 0.686*** 14,449
Lower Saxony -9.391*** -0.0457 0.721** -1.78 5.162*** -0.142 0.654*** 1,505
North Rhine-
Westphalia
-9.797*** 0.127*** 1.545*** -0.395 1.752*** -0.301*** 0.687*** 46,625
Hesse -10.48*** 0.471*** 1.355*** -0.819 -0.0107 0.0535 0.809*** 11,637
Rhineland-Palatinate -10.58*** 0.225** 1.452*** 4.558*** -0.968* -0.323*** 0.797*** 12,159
Saarland -9.239*** 0.152*** 1.581*** 0.404 0.684** -0.221*** 0.627*** 62,872
Baden-Württemberg -7.822*** -0.0634 1.699*** 1.081* -0.229 -0.227*** 0.554*** 41,198
Bavaria -7.075*** 0.222** 1.232*** -1.399 -0.297 0.347*** 0.537*** 7,185
Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania
-9.745*** 0.262*** 1.416*** -0.648 -0.637* 0.434*** 0.749*** 15,706
Brandenburg -9.896*** 0.269*** 1.349*** 0.93 0.348 -0.0454 0.740*** 31,068
Saxony-Anhalt -7.269*** 0.0663 1.034*** -1.539* 5.540*** -0.0285 0.529*** 10,997
Thuringia -9.425*** 0.184*** 1.803*** 0.245 1.026*** -0.218*** 0.681*** 105,908
Saxony -8.821*** 0.106*** 1.362*** 1.767*** 1.575*** -0.211*** 0.648*** 104,938
All -8.582*** 0.141*** 1.569*** 0.791*** 0.855*** -0.164*** 0.655*** 467,033
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Next we consider the capital intensity (CI) of ﬁrms. The share of ﬁxed assets to total
assets has a negative and signiﬁcant (1% level) impact on internally ﬁnanced growth.
This ﬁnding suggests that access to external capital is particularly important for capital
intensive industries. Thus, ﬁrms with a higher share of ﬁxed assets with no recourse to
external short- and long-term capital ﬁnd it harder to grow at rates that exceed their
internal resources.
The variable Lerner index (LI) describes the market power of savings banks in their
16respective region and examines whether higher market power of savings banks is conducive
or detrimental to ﬁrm growth. We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the market
power of savings banks on ﬁrm growth which is likely to reﬂect the better availability of
credit in close borrower-lender relationships. These ﬁndings are consistent with those of
Petersen and Rajan (1994), Zarutskie (2003) and Berger, Rosen, and Udell (2007) and
corroborate the information hypothesis which states that less concentrated markets are
associated with better credit availability because competitive banking markets can weaken
relationship building by depriving banks of the incentive to invest in soft information.
Our next variable is the growth rate of the regional economy (GDP). As expected
we ﬁnd that a stronger growth of the local economy also spurs ﬁrms’ excess growth due
to increased availability of internal funds. The ambiguity of the relationship for some
federal states in this regard is likely to be driven by the lack of variance of this variable
in states which comprise only few regions; in the regression for the full sample, however,
the variable is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The regression results also show that ﬁrms exceeding their internal growth rate base a
higher share of their ﬁnancial structure on debt. From the agency point of view, this rela-
tion is somewhat surprising. The agency theory predicts that high-growth ﬁrms are prone
to reduce their reliance on debt ﬁnancing in order to preserve ﬁnancial ﬂexibility for times
when ﬁnancing requirements are more urgent. Furthermore, the agency story also sug-
gests that high-growth ﬁrms will employ less debt in order to avoid the underinvestment
problem described in the previous section.
Our results are opposite to this conjecture, since we ﬁnd that ﬁrms exceeding their IGR
and SGR have both a higher leverage (LE) which suggests that ﬁrms use both short- and
long-term debt to fund growth. This relation, however, is not unique to ﬁrms primarily
ﬁnanced by savings banks. Buch and Doepke (2008) report similiar ﬁndings for a sample
of German ﬁrms over almost the exact observation period but using a ﬁrm-level dataset
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Hence, our explanation aims to account for the
role of relationship lending for small ﬁrms and speciﬁc features of the ﬁnancial system:
Since access to capital markets is limited for small ﬁrms and particular in Germany which
is often characterized as bank-based system (Krahnen and Schmidt 2004) high-growth
ﬁrms may have moderate choices to ﬁnance their excess growth with other capital sources
than additional bank credit in particular since the hold-up problem may be more severe for
17such ﬁrms. From a hausbank’s point of view, the "soft"-information which was gathered
over the duration of the relationship could provide a higher debt capacity due to reﬁned
contract terms (Berger and Udell 1995) than sole "hard"-information which is used when
banks do not have had prior contact to the borrower. In addition, the discounted value of
predicted future cash ﬂows from ﬁrms’ additional projects could also add to an extended
debt capacity.
Our prime variable of interest, however, is the proportion of savings banks loans to
total bank loans (SB). This relation is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level suggesting
that a higher share of savings banks loans enhances ﬁrm growth due to an increased
availability of funds which, in turn, allows to realize growth options.
Table 7: Constraints on long-term external ﬁnancing
Table 7 reports the regression results of the logit model with LTGROi as dependent variable. LTGROi is calculated as the
proportion of years for each ﬁrm in which the sales growth exceeded the predicted growth rate if a ﬁrm funds its growth
with internal cash-ﬂows and short-term ﬁnancing. Furthermore, we control for regional diﬀerences in the federal states by
using dummy variables for diﬀerent regions within each state (not reported). The estimated model is LTGROFirmi= i















Schleswig-Holstein -10.18*** 0.397*** 1.971*** 0.894 2.569*** 0.326*** 0.659*** 14,449
Lower Saxony -9.213*** 0.141 0.735** -0.362 4.133** -0.0231 0.629*** 1,505
North Rhine-
Westphalia
-9.165*** 0.231*** 1.469*** 0.134 2.061*** 0.123*** 0.585*** 46,625
Hesse -10.69*** 0.680*** 1.396*** 1.654 -0.198 0.445*** 0.773*** 11,637
Rhineland-Palatinate -11.12*** 0.527*** 1.616*** 4.346*** 0.555 -0.122 0.777*** 12,159
Saarland -8.023*** 0.269*** 1.370*** 1.049** 0.874*** 0.166*** 0.510*** 62,872
Baden-Württemberg -7.820*** 0.05 1.556*** 0.682 0.23 0.120*** 0.513*** 41,198
Bavaria -8.230*** 0.282*** 1.559*** 0.437 0.818 0.567*** 0.564*** 7,185
Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania
-9.579*** 0.360*** 1.377*** 0.322 -0.421 0.748*** 0.695*** 15,706
Brandenburg -9.191*** 0.386*** 1.021*** 1.071 0.978** 0.303*** 0.649*** 31,068
Saxony-Anhalt -6.943*** 0.0802 1.052*** -
2.373***
5.640*** 0.109 0.473*** 10,997
Thuringia -8.911*** 0.324*** 1.551*** -0.116 1.410*** 0.0826*** 0.599*** 105,908
Saxony -8.528*** 0.220*** 1.404*** 1.729*** 1.743*** 0.144*** 0.575*** 104,938
All -8.017*** 0.268*** 1.474*** 0.797*** 1.010*** 0.173*** 0.579*** 467,033
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The results for Table 7 are analogous to those reported in Table 6 with one exception;
the inﬂuence of the share of ﬁxed assets on excess growth ﬁnanced by long-term ﬁnancing
is reversed. An explanation for this ﬁnding could be the design of the variable RoLTAi.
Since PPE is generally ﬁnanced with long-term capital, calculating the return on short-
term capital (total assets less long-term liabilities) could lead to a lower probability of
excess growth for the respective ﬁrms. Consider, for instance, a capital intensive business
18for which the return on short-term assets is, all other things equal, likely to be higher.
Consequently, it will be more diﬃcult for this ﬁrm to exceed the predicted growth rate
which, in turn, would lead to a negative impact of PPE on excess growth.
Thus far, the design of our dependent variable only allowed us to estimate the impact
of the degree of savings bank ﬁnancing – not the impact of hausbank-relationships in
general.
Table 8: The inﬂuence of relationship lending on ﬁrms’ excess growth
Table 8 reports the regression results of the logit model with LTGROi and STGROi as dependent variables. Both dependent
variables are calculated as described above. The sample consists of 467,033 ﬁrm observations in all German federal states
over the period 1996–2006. Instead of a metrical scaled covariate we use a dummy variable which takes the value one
if a ﬁrm has more than 75% of all bank loans with a savings bank and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we control for the
possibility that ﬁrms with a lower proportion of savings bank loans may have a hausbank-relationships with another bank
by subsequently including a dummy if the proportion of savings banks loans is less than 25% for the respective ﬁrm.
LEVERAGE is calculated as a ﬁrm’s total debt over total assets. REGIONAL GDP is the average annual growth rate
of the GDP in a given region. LERNER INDEX depicts the ability of the respective regional savings bank to charge
prices above its marginal costs and as such a proxy for competition. Therefore a higher index stands for a lesser degree of
competition. CAPITAL INTENSITY is calculated as ﬁxed assets over total assets and controls for diﬀerent industries such
as service (low capital intensity) and production (high capital intensity). SIZE is the natural logarithm of a ﬁrm’s total
assets. Finally, the REGIONAL DUMMY controls for diﬀerent conditions in the respective federal states. The estimated
model is ExcessGrowthFirmi= i + 1SBi + 2SBi + 3LEi + 4GDPi + 5LIi + 6CIi + 7SIZEi + 8REGj +
i. The model is estimated with a robust Huber/White/sandwich estimator.
Dependent Variable STGRO STGRO STGRO LTGRO LTGRO LTGRO
HAUSBANK DUMMY (>75%) -0.456*** 0.0404*** 0.0275*** -0.328*** 0.141*** 0.125***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
HAUSBANK DUMMY (0<25%) -0.0496*** -0.0598***
(0.019) (0.017)
LEVERAGE 0.854*** 1.574*** 1.577*** 0.803*** 1.481*** 1.485***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
REGIONAL GDP 1.097*** 0.806*** 0.803*** 1.066*** 0.818*** 0.815***
(0.163) (0.170) (0.170) (0.148) (0.155) (0.155)
LERNER INDEX 1.608*** 0.876*** 0.875*** 1.667*** 1.035*** 1.034***
(0.078) (0.082) (0.082) (0.073) (0.076) (0.076)
CAPITAL INTENSITY 0.250*** -0.157*** -0.156*** 0.519*** 0.178*** 0.180***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
SIZE 0.649*** 0.649*** 0.572*** 0.573***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
REGIONAL DUMMY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CONST. 0.963*** -8.434*** -8.438*** 0.555*** -7.834*** -7.840***
(0.103) (0.117) (0.117) (0.094) (0.108) (0.108)
N. of Obs. 467,033 467,033 467,033 467,033 467,033 467,033
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Therefore we undertake a further robustness check on our measure for close borrower-
lender relationships by substituting the continuous savings bank variable by two dummy
variables which indicate a hausbank-relationship with either a savings bank or (poten-
tially) another bank (Table 8). We do this to (i) account for the possibility that a ﬁrm
with commitments less than 25% of its ﬁnancial liabilities to savings banks may as well
have a hausbank-relationship with, say, a cooperative bank and (ii) thus allow the rela-
tionship between savings bank credit and excess growth to be non-linear. Speciﬁcally, as
19an indicator of beneﬁcial hausbank-relationships in general, we would expect a positive
relation on growth for both variables. This expectation, however, rests on the assump-
tion that ﬁrms with less than 25% savings bank loans do in fact have a dominant credit
exposure to another single bank.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 8 show the inﬂuence of the (subsequently added)
hausbank-dummy variables on ﬁrms’ excess growth which only use internal funds, the
second three columns the values when ﬁrms also have access to short-term borrowing.
Since savings banks have a particular focus on smaller ﬁrms (see Table 1) we see that the
variable size is critical to the results. Thus, when size is not accounted for the results
are reverse. Interestingly, the impact of relationship lending is much stronger when ﬁrms
have only limited access to long-term funding. This suggests that it is in particular
the provision of long-term ﬁnancing which constitutes the beneﬁcial eﬀects of hausbank-
relationships. The ﬁnding that a proportion of savings bank loans below 25% is associated
with lower ﬁrm growth seems somewhat peculiar. However, since we have no insights into
the reasons that determine lower ﬁnancial savings banks involvement (for instance if it is
rather demand or supply driven) any interpretation would be speculative.
As a further robustness check of our results we repeat the regressions using a strat-
iﬁed sample to control for a possible bias due the high share of ﬁrms with hausbank-
relationships in our data. Moreover, we use a Tobit approach (Model 2, Table 9) and
measure the excess growth variable for ﬁrms that are constraint by long-term ﬁnancing
not as dummy but as metrically scaled variable. We ﬁnd that the positive inﬂuence of
hausbank-relationships on excess growth remains unchanged.
20Table 9: Robustness Regressions
Table 9 presents additional regressions to validate the robustness of our results under diﬀerent speciﬁcations. First, we
control for the possibility that our results may be biased due to the large share of ﬁrms with hausbank-relationships in our
sample. Therefore we generate a stratiﬁed sample with 50,000 observations from each quartile of the proportion of savings
banks loans. Model (1) then re-runs the full regression from Table 8 with LTGROi as independent variable. LTGROi
equals one if a ﬁrm exceeds its short-term ﬁnanced growth rate in a given year and zero otherwise. In model (2), on
the other hand, LTGROi is not calculated as dummy but as metrically scaled variable giving the degree by which a ﬁrm
exceeds its short-term ﬁnanced growth rate. This model uses a Tobit approach with the sample censored at zero due to
the consideration of excess growth only. The estimated model is LTGROi= i + 1SBi + 2SBi + 3LEi + 4GDPi +
5LIi + 6CIi + 7SIZEi + 8REGj + i. The model is estimated with a robust Huber/White/sandwich estimator.
Model (1) (2)
Dependent Variable LTGRO LTGROmetr:
HAUSBANK DUMMY (>75%) 0.144*** 0.0772***
(0.015) (0.019)




REGIONAL GDP 1.336*** -0.163
(0.256) (0.284)
LERNER INDEX 1.031*** 0.372**
(0.127) (0.153)




REGIONAL DUMMY Yes Yes
CONST. -7.245*** -6.193***
(0.175) (0.172)
N. of Obs. 180,503 180,503
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
6 Conclusion
This study investigates the contribution of public banks to the funding and beneﬁcial
development of SME. To this end we examine whether close borrowers-lender relationships
help ﬁrms to grow faster than by relying on internal resources or short-term ﬁnancing only.
In a ﬁrst step, the descriptive evidence which yields some interesting ﬁndings about
the properties of hausbank-relationships is presented: First, smaller ﬁrms are more likely
to have hausbank-relationships. The median size of such ﬁrms is e549,639 whereas the
median size of ﬁrms with multiple lending relations is e1,271,998. Second, the long-
term liabilities of ﬁrms with hausbank-relationships almost double those with multiple
relationships while the overall leverage is about the same. Third, single bank depended
borrowers seem to have less problems accommodating their ﬁnancial obligations (including
leases) as depicted by their higher interest coverage ratios.
Based thereon, we follow cross-country ﬁrm-level studies by Demirgüç-Kunt and Mak-
simovic (1998, 2002) and develop a measure of predicted growth based on ﬁrms’ internal-
21and short-term funds. We then use these measures to create dummy variables which
indicate whether ﬁrms exceeded their predicted growth rates and subsequently predict
the indicator variables by the share of savings banks loans as well as hausbank-dummy
covariates.
We ﬁnd that strong ties between ﬁrms and savings banks enhance access to (long-
term) capital and ultimately spur ﬁrm growth. These results hold for diﬀerent model and
hausbank-proxy speciﬁcations and are in line with Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger
and Udell (1995) for small U.S. ﬁrms and Elston (1996) for German manufacturing ﬁrms.
The results further suggest that it is in particular the provision of long-term ﬁnancing
which constitutes the beneﬁcial eﬀects of hausbank-relationships. As further research it
would be interesting to investigate whether these beneﬁcial features are constituted by
hausbank-relationships in general or or if they are rather a particular characteristic of
savings banks.
22A Additional Tables
Table 10: Correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
IGR (1) 1
SGR (2) 0.0001 1
Proportion of savings banks loans (3) 0.003* 0.004* 1
Leverage (4) -0.0055* 0.0009 0.076* 1
GDP growth (5) 0.0006 0.003* 0.007* 0.005* 1
Lerner Index (6) 0.0012 0.003* 0.015* 0.028* 0.0069* 1
Capital intensity (7) -0.0006 -0.001 0.015* -0.093* 0.0028 -0.053* 1
Size (8) -0.0082* -0.0157* -0.309* -0.192* 0.007* 0.0362* 0.145* 1
* indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Table 11: Results of eﬃciency and Lerner estimates
The Lerner index components, average revenues and marginal cost, are estimated from stochastic cost and proﬁt panel
analysis. Multiple outputs of the banks as well as ﬁnancial expenses are explicitly accounted for when estimating eﬃciency
and Lerner indices. The data is obtained from the German Savings Banks Association’s (DSGV) Bank Performance
Comparison and covers the period from 1996 to 2006. For a more in-depth discussion on the calculation of Lerner indices
see Koetter and Vins (2008).
Variable Mean SD Min 25%p 75%p Max
Cost eﬃciency CE 0.828 0.039 0.519 0.808 0.855 0.919
Proﬁt eﬃciency PE 0.534 0.096 0.038 0.476 0.606 0.757
Lerner index Lerner 0.237 0.057 0.064 0.196 0.277 0.52
Notes: 4,934 observations in the period 1996–2006.
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